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PAROL TRUSTS IN NORTH CAROLINA
B. THORN LORD* AND M. T. VAN HEcxE**
There is no statute in North Carolina specifically requiring the
creation or proof of trusts in land to be in writing.' One might think,
therefore, as Chief Justice Pearson believed, 2 that parol trusts to the
extent that they prevailed at common law are valid in this jurisdic-
tion. Actually, however, the scope of enforceable parol trusts in land
has been greatly narrowed -by judicial borrowings from other safe-
guards.
THE DEED CASES
Four main types of cases have arisen in North Carolina involving
parol trusts in connection with deeds inter sdvos: (1) A to B on oral
trust for C, the agreement preceding or coinciding with the convey-
ance. (2) Same transaction, except that the agreement is made
subsequent to the conveyance. (3) A declares himself orally to be
trustee for C. (4) A to B on oral trust for A.
(1) The North Carolina courts have always given effect to an
oral trust created prior to or contemporaneously with a conveyance
by A to B for C.3 Chiefly, reliance has been placed upon the absence
*Third Year student, University of North Carolina School of Law.
**Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
'See 29 CAR. II, c. 3, s. 7 (1676). The seventh section of the English Stat-
ute of Frauds has been substantially adopted in many states. It provides that
declarations or creations of uses or trusts in lands must be manifested and
proved by a memorandum signed by the party declaring the trust.
The following states and territory have no such statutory provision: Ari-
zona, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, Louisiana, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Vir-
ginia, and Wyoming.
In several of these states parol trusts in land are not allowed. In other
states the cases vary widely in result, and the methods by which the result is
reached. See BOGERT ON TRUSTS (1921) §20, n. 77. See also, Scowr, CASES
ON TRUSTS (1919) 193, n. 1; Amxs, CASES ON TRUSTS (2nd ed. 1893) 176,
n. 1; 1 PERRY ON TRUSTS (6th ed. 1911) §§ 75, 78, n. 1; 3 PomEtoy, EQuITY
JURISPRUDENcE (4th ed. 1918) §1006, n. a.
For general discussions of trusts of land based on oral promises see Scott,
Conveyances Upon Trusts Not Properly Declared (1924) 37 HARv. L. Rnv.
653; Costigan, Constructive Trusts Based on Promises Made to Secure Be-
quests, Devises, or Intestate Succession, (1915) 28 ibid. 237, 251, 266; Benson,
Parol Trusts in Real Estate (1915) 1 VA. L. REG. 81.
'Shelton v. Shelton, 58 N. C. 292, 294 (1859). Scott, Conveyances Upon
Trusts Not Properly Declared, supra note 1, at 657. n. 19.
'Foy v. Foy, 3 N. C. 131 (1801); Shelton v. Shelton, supra note 2; Mul-
holland v. York, 82 N. C. 510 (1880); Leggett v. Leggett, 88 N. C. 108 (1883) ;
Smiley v. Pearce, 98 N. C. 185, 3 S. E. 631 (1887) ; Holden v. Strickland, 116
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of a statute requiring a writing in trust cases.4 Later cases, however,
have bolstered up this doctrine by 2 resort to the theory of con-
structive trusts, suggesting that it would be unconscionable for B to
keep the land in breach of his contract.5 A distinction has been made,
sometimes, as to the amount of evidence required. Clearer evidence
has been thought necessary in the case where the alleged trust agree-
ment was entered into before the execution of the deed, than in the
case where the trust arises at the time of the conveyance.6
(2) When the parol trust agreement is entered into by B with A
for the benefit of C, after the conveyance from A to B, no enforce-
able trust arises.7 The reasons given are usually two: the equitable
interest must either be itself conveyed or be an incident of the con-
N. C. 185, 21 S. E. 684 (1895) ; Cobb v. Edwards, 117 N. C. 245, 23 S. E. 241
(1895); Kelly v. McNeill, 118 N. C. 349, 24 S. E. 738 (1896); Hughes v.
Pritchard, 122 N. C. 59, 29 S. E. 93 (1898) ; Norton v. McDevitt, 122 N. C.
755, 30 S. E. 24 (1898) ; Owens v. Williams, 130 N. C. 165, 41 S. E. 93 (1902) ;
Sylses v. Boone, 132 N. C. 199, 43 S. E. 645, 95 Am. St. Rep. 619 (1903);
Avery v. Stewart 136 N. C. 426, 48 S. E. 775, 68 L. R. A. 776 (1904) ; Taylor
v. Wahab, 154 N. C. 219, 70 S. E. 173 (1911) Anderson v. Harrington, 163
N. C. 140, 79 S. E. 436 (1913) ; Jones v. Jones -1641 N. C. 320, 80 S. E. 430
(1913) ; Lutz v. Hoyle, 167 N. C. 632, 83 S. E. 749 (1914) ; Grimes v. Andrews
170 N. C. 515, 87 S. E. 341 (1915), Ballard v. Boyette 171 N. C. 24, 86 S. F_.
175 (1915); Boone v. Lee 175 N. C. 383, 95 S. E. 659 (1918); Williams v.
Honeycutt, 176 N. C. 102, 96 S. E. 730 (1918) ; Rush v. McPherson, 176 N. C.
562, 97 S. E. 613 (1918); Lefkowitz v. Silver, 182 N. C. 339, 109 S. E. 56
(1921) ; Greensboro Bank v. Scott, 184 N. C. 312, 114 S. E. 475 (1922) ; Cun-
ningham v. Long, 186 N. C. 526; 120 S. E. 116 (1923). See Frey v. Ramsour,
66 N. C. 466 (1872), where the Court said, that when A conveyed to B by deed
absolute, and at the same time it is agreed that B or any third person may
under a power of appointment afterwards make an oral declaration of trust,
that will be enforced.
' Shelton v. Shelton; Smiley v. Pearce; Cobb v. Edwards; Hughes v.
Pritchard; Owens v. Williams; Taylor v. Wahab; Lutz v. Hoyle; Ballard v.
Boyette, all supra note 3. See (1923) 32- YALE L. J. 509.
Such language as found in Avery v. Stewart, supra note 3, ("it is not
necessary to decide if an express trust is created here-B has abused the con-
fidence placed in him, he is converted into a trustee ex maleficio") is evident in
a long line of cases. See Rush v. McPherson; Lefkowitz v. Silver, both supra
note 3. For example, in Rush v. McPherson, ibid, the court holds there is an
enforceable express trust, but the fact of the confidental relationship of prin-
cipal and agent was most strongly stressed.
Holden v. Strickland (Held, there is an express trust as well as one aris-
ing by operation of law) ; Boone v. Lee; Greensboro Banks v. Scott, all supra
note 3. On the facts, Greensboro Bank v. Scott, ibid, seems to be a misappli-
cation of the doctrine of trusts. This case is noted in (1923) 32 YALE L. J.
509; (1923) 9 VA. L. REv. 312.
Norton v. McDevitt; Mulholland v. York, both supra note 3.
6 Smiley v. Pearce, supra note 3.
'Pittman v. Pittman, 107 N. C. 159, 12 S. E. 61 (1890). Dover v. Rhea.
108 N. C. 88, 13 S. E. 164 (1891) ; Hamilton v. Buchanan. 112 N. C. 463, 17
S. E. 159 (1893) ; Wilson v. Jones, 176 N. C. 205, 97 S. E. 613 (1918).
The Court says in Wilson v. Jones, ibid., that B's promise gave C merely
an option which B failed to live up to.
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veyance of the legal estate.8 And the transaction violates the Statute
of Frauds relating to land contracts (hereinafter referred to as
section 988). 9 No constructive trust can be spelled out, because B,
by keeping the land, does not violate any promise given as a consid-7
eration for the conveyance. Unless B receives fresh consideration
for his promise there would seem to be no contract,10 the previous
conveyance being insufficient consideration because past. If, how-
ever, he does receive a new consideration for his promise, we may
have a contract, but §988 requires a writing as a prerequisite to
enforceability." Practically, however, is this not a case of B in
either event orally declaring himself trustee of land he already owns
for C?
(3) Even so, the result is the same. For in the cases where A
has orally declared himself trustee of his land for C, the North
Carolina courts have refused to recognize the trust.12 The usual
explanation is substantially the same as that given in the preceding
paragraph. The question of the form of the promise in these cases,
however, is inevitably intertwined with the problem of consideration.
Following Ex parte Pye,' s no objection has been voiced against the
enforcement of oral trusts without consideration, where the subject
matter is personal property.' 4 Where it is land, however, and the
'See Pittman v. Pittman, supra note 7.
'N. C. CODE (1927), §988. This covers only a part of the situations dealt
with by §4 of the English Statute of Frauds.
"The North Carolina Court states the common-law rule to be that "no
use or trust can be raised in lands without a consideration, except in the single
instance of a conveyance operating by transmutation of possession, the char-
acter of the conveyance alone being sufficient to raise the use and to dispense
with the necessity of consideration." Pittman v. Pittman, supra note 7.
A gratuitous declaration of trust of land is upheld in other jurisdictions.
Neal v. Bryant, 91 Mo. 81, 235 S. W. 1075 (1921). Scorr, CASES oN TRUSTS
(1919) 146, n. 1; AmEs, LEcrupxs oN LGAL HisTORY 425, also printed in
(1907) 20 HARv. L. REv. 549.
' While the court made no reference to Pittman v. Pittman in regard to
consideration, supra note 7, later cases indicate, perhaps unconsci6us of the
problem that is involved, that a trust arises but the Statute of Frauds prevents
it being enforced. N. C. Code (1927) §988; Dover v. Rhea and Hamilton
v. Buchanan, both supra note 7.
In this light, B's promise simple amounts to a parol agreement to convey
land. If B's answer in a suit by C against B admits the oral declaration, §988
is satisfied. Hollar v. Richards, 102 N. C. 545; 9 S. E. 460 (1889). Fortescue
v. Crawford, 105 N. C. 29, 10 S. E. 910 (1890).
Frey v. Ramsour, supra note 3. But see note (1913) 61 UNIv. PA. L. Rzv.
687. The question here is the same as where after transfer of title B orally
declares himself trustee. See supra note 7.
'18 Ves. Jr. 140, 34 Eng. Repr. 271 (1811).
' Witherington v. Herring, 140 N. C. 495, 53 S. E. 303 (1906) ; Rosseau v.
McCall. 169 N. C. 173, 85 S. E. 414 (1915).
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alleged consideration is love and affection for a close relative, the
history of the covenant to stand seized15 requires a sealed writing.
Where the consideration is valuable, even though the interest in
land involved is a freehold, the old English Statute of Enrollment 16
has not been a factor in the North Carolina cases'T for the reason
that we are confronted with a common-law contract concerning an
interest in land' 8 and §988 requires a writing.
(4) Where A has conveyed to B on an oral trust for A himself,
the North Carolina courts permit B to keep the land and refuse to
find any trust whatsoever.' 9 This, because of the Parol Evidence
rule20 and §988 relating to land contracts. Neither of these two
safeguards, however, would seem to be properly applicable to the
situation in hand.2 1 The creation of a trust of land by parol does
not vary the terms of the deed, insofar as the legal title is concerned,
but sets up an independent contract consistent with the deed.
2 2  Stat-
utes prohibiting oral trusts in land would have been unnecessary if
the Parol Evidence rule had had a legitimate function in this con-
nection.28 The device in question, A to B for A, characterized most
of the common-law uses out of which the law of trusts arose.2 4 And,
as for the Statute of Frauds, the transaction in A to B for C (dis-
MoRDEcAi LAw LEcruaEs (1916) 701, 1004-1009; TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY
(2d ed. 1920) §§100, 428.
"6See TIFFANY, op. cit. supra n. 15, at §428.
11Ibid.
'See Pittman v. Pittman, supra note 7, Kelly v. McNeil, supra note 3.
"Streator v. Jones, 5 N. C. 449 (1910) ; Ferguson v. Haas, 64 N. C. 772
(1870) ; Gaylord v. Gaylord, 150 N. C. 222, (1909) ; Campbell v. Sigmon, 170
N. C. 348, 87 S. E. 116 (1915) ; Walters v. Walters, 172 N. C. 328 (1916) ;
Chilton v. Smith 180 N. C. 472, 105 S. E. 1 (1920) ; Blue v. City of Wilming-
ton 119 S. E. 812, 186 N. C. 321 (1923); Waddell v. Aycock 195 N. C. 268,
142 S. E. 10 (1928).
" For a complete discussion of the so-called Parol Evidence rule see WIG-
MORE ON EVIDENCE (2nd ed. 1923) §2400 et seq.
' Scorr, CASES ON TRUST (1919) 193, n. 1; Scott: Conveyances upon Trusts
Not Properly Declared, supra n. 1; 1 PERRY ON TRUSTS (6th ed. 1911) §76
n. (a).
Gaylord v. Gaylord, supra Note 19, is cited as the leading case but see Mr.
Justice Connor's opinion dissenting and further declaring the majority opinion
obiter dicta. It is submitted that Mr. Justice Connor's assertions represent the
correct view.
It is interesting, too, to note that the court indiscriminately applies either
of these safeguards-making no distinction as to their use.
Mr. Wigmore seems to believe there is no objection so far as the Parol
Evidence rule is concerned to an extrinsic agreement to hold in trust. WIG-
MORE ON EVMENCE (2nd ed. 1923) §2437.
See Shelton v. Shelton, supra note 3.
"See the materials referred to in note 21, supra.
Scott The Trust as an Instrument of Law Reform (1922) 31 Yale L. J.
457. 4 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 407-480 (1924).
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cussed in paragraph 1) would seem just as deserving of the statute's
protection.2 5 Yet that case, far from failing because of any sup-
posed bar of the Statute of Frauds, has always been characterized in
this state by an enforcement directly in the teeth of the policy of
§988.26 Probably, however, the reason for the court's borrowing from
the Parol Evidence rule and the contract Statute of Frauds in order to
prevent a trust in the A to B for A situation is a conviction like that of
the Alabama court that "practically, it is difficult to conceive of any
good motive a grantor can have in the execution of an absolute con-
veyance, intending that the grantee shall be the mere repository of a
naked legal title, while he reserves the exclusive beneficial interest."
27
The deal smacks of a fraud on creditors, and is tainted with an evil
smudge dating from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries when similar
uses were widely created to escape burdensome responsibilities. But
why not say so?2s
Perhaps the same reasons are responsible for the lack of any
realization in our cases of the possibility of a constructive trust. B
is being unjustly enriched by violating his contract. England and a
minority of the American states therefore compel him to restore the
status quo.2 9 The majority feel that it would be a violation of the
Statute of Frauds3 0 relating to trusts to enter such an order. What-
ever may be the merits of that view,3 ' we have no such statute to
contend with in North Carolina. Unless influenced by some unclean
hands notion where proof of a bad motive was sufficient, 82 the North
Carolina courts might well give the property back to A, not as an
enforcement of the oral contract, but to prevent B's unjust enrich-
ment, using the contract only as proof of circumstances under which
he obtained the land.
THE WILL CASES
Three principal situations have arisen in the North Carolina cases
involving parol trusts in connection with wills: (1) A to B by will
absolute, with a prior or contemporaneous oral agreement upon the
part of B with A to hold on trust for C. (2) Same situation, except
See dissenting opinion in Gaylord v. Gaylord, supra note 19.
See cases, supra note 3.
Patton v. Beecher, 62 Ala. 579, 593 (1878).
See the material referred to in note 24, supra.
Scott, Conveyances upon Trusts Not Properly Declared (1924) 37 Hmaw.
L Rav. 653, 657.
' Ibid, at page 658.
That is, why not make the refusal of relief dependant upon an actual
showing, rather than a presumption, of bad faith?
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that the agreement is entered into after the execution of the will.
(3) A to B by a will which on its face carries evidence of an inten-
tion to create a trust, the object of which or the identity of whose
beneficiary, however, is undisclosed.
(1) In the first case listed, the North Carolina Court has in one
case enforced the oral trust for C as an express trust, saying that in
consequence of B's promise, A has refrained from executing his in-
tended purpose and that it would be a fraud on C for B to avail him-
self of the omission.33 In that case of Cook v. Redman,3 4 the prom-
ise was apparently honestly made both to A and to C. It seems not
to have occurred to the Court in that case that to enforce the oral
±rust might violate the policy of §988, possibly because the agreement
related only to the cash proceeds from the sale of both realty and
personalty. Nor does the Court appear to have remembered the
.strong. language of an earlier opinion that "with regard to attested
wills, it is well known to the profession how strictly, we may say
sternly, the courts have demanded a compliance with these provisions
,of the law."8 5 That is to say, the transaction as a whole amounted
to a testamentary disposition to C, only the first step of which ful-
.filled the requirement of the Statute of Wills. It would, of- course,
be wrong to permit B to keep the property, but would it not in view
,of the arbitrary policy of the Wills Act have been the better solution
to declare B a constructive trustee for A's heirs and next of kin? 6
(2) Where, however, the oral agreement between B and A is en-
tered into subsequently to the execution of the will, the North Caro-
lina courts permit B to keep the land.3 7 Most courts outside of this
state regard it as immaterial when the agreement was made,3 8 just
so it was made before A's death. The distinction in North Carolina
is based upon the provisions of a statute: "No conveyance or other
act made or done subsequently to the execution of a will of or relat-
'Cook v. Redrman, 37 N. C. 623 (1843) (residue of property to be turned
into personalty and divided); Thompson v. Newlin, 38 N. C. 338 (1844)
(dicta).
"Supra, note 33.
"Little v. Lockman, 49 N. C. 495, 496 (1857). And see N. C. CoDE (1927)
§4131.
' See Costigan, Constructive Trusts Based on Promises Made to Secure
Bequests, Devises, or Intestate Succession, supra note 1; Scott, Conveyances
Upon Trusts not Properly Declared, supra note 1. But Dean Ames believed
the Statute of Frauds and not the Statute of Wills would be violated if the
property was given to C. See AmEs, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORy, 430.
" Wood v. Cherry, 73 N. C. 110 (1875) ; Chappell v. White, 146 N. C. 571,
60 S. E. 635 (1908).
' Scott, Conveyances Upon Trusts Not Property Declared, supra note 1.
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ing to any real or personal estate therein comprised, except an act by
which such will shall be duly revoked, shall prevent the operation of
the will. . . ."9 This enactment dates from 1844. In Chapoll v.
White,40 decided in 1908, the court asserted that "this statute was
evidently enacted in view of the decision of this court, in 1843, in
Cook v. Rednn,41 in which a trust of this kind was upheld." But
that case dealt with an oral agreement made before the execution of
the will, and the statute relates only to acts done thereafter. Never-
theless, the court went on to say42 "that the doctrine of implied and
secret trusts, as applicable to devises prior to the act of 1844, should
be recognized and followed by this court . . .and then repudiated
in Wood v. Cherry43 as contrary to our statute, is conclusive to our
minds that the court intended to give effect to what it regarded as
the manifest will of the General Assembly, and to prohibit entirely
the attaching to devises of secret trusts by means of parol evidence."
The case in which that statement was made, however, and the case
of Wood v. Cherry, presented merely a situation of an oral trust at-
tempted after the execution of a will. The language is broad enough,
on the other hand, to cover the situation discussed in (1) above,
namely, an oral trust attempted prior to the execution of a will.
-Perhaps, too, it is more than a coincidence that since 1844 no case of
the later type has required a square decision on the point. Dicta,
however, in December 44 of that year and again in 1882,45 adhere
to the doctrine of Cook v. Redman.
It is submitted that the Supreme Court of North Carolina has
lost sight of the original significance of this statute. It was not en-
acted as a reaction to Cook v. Redman and had in fact nothing to do
with parol trusts in connection with wills. Instead, it was a part of
a widespread legislative movement in this country40 to change the
common-law rule that a will operated from the time of its execution,
like a deed, and not from the time of death. Witness the remarks
of Pearson, J., in 1853:47
'N. C. CODE (1927) §4136; P. L. 1844, c. 88, §2.
" Supra note 37, at p. 573.
'Supra note 33.
"Chappell v. White, supra note 37, at p. 576.
"Supra note 37.
"Thompson v. Newlin, supra note 33, at page 342.
"Robinson v. McDiarmid, 87 N. C. 455, 462 (1882).
"M ORDEcAI, LAW LECTuREs (1916) 1164-1169; PAGE, WxLLS (2d ed. 1926)
§467.
"'Ex parte Champion, 45 N. C. 246, at p. 248 (1853). And see MoRD Al,
op. cit. supra, note 46.
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"The first section of the Act of 1844, changes a well settled rule
of law, and allows lands, and all interest in real estate to pass by
devise although acquired subsequently to the execution thereof. The
second section changes another well-settled rule, and provides that no
conveyances, after the execution of a devise shall prevent whatever
interest the devisor may have at the time of his death, from passing.
The third section changes another, and provides that devises shall
be construed to speak and take effect as if executed, not at the time
of execution, but as if executed immediately upon the death of the
devisor, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will. The
fourth section provides that a lapse or void devise shall be included
in the residuary clause; and the fifth section provides that a devise
of real estate shall include any real estate which the devisor has power
to dispose of.
"It is evident from the whole of this statute, that its object was
to give to devises the most ample operation, and to change certain
rules of construction which had been adopted by the courts, but were
considered by the Legislature as too technical and stringent, and cal-
culated to defeat rather than carry out the intention of the devisors."
Yet the same judge who thus outlined the purpose of the Act of
1844, later, in Wood v. Cherry,48 decided in 1875, seized upon the
second section of that statute and extended its field of operations so
as to block an oral trust attempted subsequently to the execution of
a will and thus laid a basis for the further extension of its signifi-
cance in Chapell v. White.
The present status of parol trusts created prior to or contempo-
raneously with the execution of a will', in North Carolina, therefore
rests today upon a conflict between the decision in Cook v. Redmon
and the two later dicta, on the one hand, and the technically unjusti-
fied but earnest view of Chapell v. White, on the other, that the Act
of 1844 has abolished the device in its entirety. It is believed that
the result reached by the latter case is sound and that parol trusts
in connection with wills should not be upheld, unless a clear case of
actual fraud by B upon C should make it necessary for the court to
raise a constructive trust for C's benefit. It would be unfortunate,
however, if the court's view means only that B may keep the land
given to him solely because he has promised to hold it for another.
"'The late Dean Mordecai had this to say about this case: "A very peculiar
application of this section, to say the least of it, is to be found in [Wood v.
Cherry]. If the utterance there to be found means what it says, we have a
very 'precipitate and injurious decision.' 'but I do not regard what is there said
of sufficient importance to discuss it further." MoRDEcAr, op. cit. supra, note
46, at p. 1166, his note 54.
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Common decency should require, if the policy of the Wills Act for-
bids relief to C, that the status quo, as far as possible, should be re-
stored, and the property returned to the heirs and next of kin of the
settlor.
(3) Apparently only one case 49 of the third type has come before
the North Carolina Supreme Court. There, A devised property to
B "to be disposed of as I have directed." There was evidence that
this language referred to some oral directions given previously to
the execution of the will, but the nature of these directions could not
now be ascertained. It was held that B should be declared to hold
upon a resulting trust for A's heirs, the express trust having failed
for lack of evidence to establish either its object or the identity of
the beneficiaries. In a dictum, 50 however, the court indicated that
-had it been able to discover the terms of the oral trust, it would have
protected C. The present significance of such ; notion has been dis-
cussed in the preceding paragraph.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, only in one situation will a parol trust be upheld in
this jurisdiction, notwithstanding the absence of a Statute of Frauds
directly applicable to trusts. That is where A conveys to B by deed
inter vivos with a prior or contemporaneous oral agreement that B is
to hold for C. Most states having a trust Statute of Frauds, how-
ever, permit B in that situation to keep the land, because to do other-
wise would do violence to the statute. To prevent parol trusts in
situations other than the one just mentioned, the North Carolina
Supreme Court has gone to the Parol Evidence rule, to the local
contract Statute of Frauds, and to an originally irrelevant modifi-
cation of the Wills Act.
' Robinson v. McDiarmid, supra, note 45.
Ibid., at p. 462.
